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1976-77 SECURITIES LAW
DEVELOPMENTS
L DEFINITION OF A "SECURITY"
Recent litigation in the securities field indicates that the most
controversial issue in this area may be defining the transactions
covered by the securities laws. The courts have applied these laws
to various transactions bearing little resemblance to traditionally
recognized securities transactions.' Judicial analysis in recent cases
has yielded little in terms of a cohesive definitional guide concerning
a "security." The decisions have agreed, however, that the term2
"security" must be construed within the ambit of the securities acts.
Section 2 (1) of the Securities Act of 1933 ('33 Act)' and section
3(a) (10) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ('34 Act),4 provide
statutory definitions of a security, textual treatments which have
been judicially characterized as virtually identical.' The generalized
See, e.g., Miller v. Central Chinchilla Group, Inc., 494 F.2d 414 (8th Cir. 1974)
(chinchillas); Glenn Arden Commodities, Inc. v. Constantino, 493 F.2d 1027 (2d Cir.
1974) (scotch whiskey receipts); SEC v. Brigadoon Scotch Distrib., Ltd., 388 F. Supp.
1288 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (rare coins).
2 Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a-bbbb (hereinafter '33 Act); Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78 (hereinafter'34 Acr).
Section 2(1) of the '33 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1), defines a security as follows:
[T]he term 'security' means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond,
debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement, collateral-trust certificate,
preorganization certificate or subscription, transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit for a security, franctional undiveded interest in oil, gas, or other mineral
rights, or, in general, any interest or instrument commonly known as
a 'security,' or any certificate of interest or paticipation in, temporary
or interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or right
to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing.
Section 3(a) of the '33 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a) (1970) exempts from certain provisions
of that Act several classes of securities including:
Any note, draft, bill of exchange, or bankers' acceptance which arises
out of a current transaction or the proceeds of which have been or are
to be used for current transactions, and which has a maturity at the
time of issuance of not exceeding nine months, exclusive of days of
grace, or any renewal thereof the maturity of which is likewise limited.
Section 3(a) (10) of the '34 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a) (10), defines a security in a
substantially identical manner as the '33 Act, but omits the term "evidence of indebtedness;" excludes from the definition short term paper; leaves out the "current transactions" language; and makes slight changes in classification of oil and gas interests
as securities.
5 Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 342 (1967).
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language of the definitions sections of the statutes, however, precludes significant illumination of the term. The legislative history of
the acts similarly fails to define the intended scope of a "security." 6
Although the statutes themselves offer little guidance as to what
constitutes a security, some indication of the parameters of a
"security" can be derived by examining the statutory purposes behind the securities acts.
The securities statutes enunciate a broad remedial purpose of
protecting investors from fraudulent practices in the sale of securities.7 They attempt to achieve effective investor protection through
the means of disclosure and prohibition of deceptive practices in
connection with the purchase and sale of securities The '33 Act9
requires disclosure by the issuing company of information concerning
the character of securities sold in interstate and foreign commerce on
the occasion of a public offering."0 This disclosure method of investor
protection is extended under the '34 Act" to require registration by
corporations listed on the national stock exchanges and certain other
corporations. 2 Both acts contain antifraud provisions 3 providing for
6 See United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 847-48 (1975);
Landis, The Legislative History of the Securities Act of 1933, 28 GEo. WAsH. L. REv.
29, 38-46 (1959).
1 See, e.g., United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1976); SEC
v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1953); SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320
U.S. 344 (1943).
0 See, e.g., Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976); Wilko v. Swan, 346
U.S. 427 (1953); Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. Provident Life Ins. Co., 499 F.2d 715 (Sth Cir.),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1107 (1974); SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, 474 F.2d 476
(9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1974).
15 U.S.C. § 77a-bbbb (1970).
10 The '33 Act requires a registration statement to be filed in advance of a public
offering, § § 4 and 5 of the '33 Act, 15 U.S.C. § § 77d and 3 (1970); Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc. v. SEC, 389 F. Supp. 689 (D.D.C. 1974) (filing must include
information important to a "reasonable investor"). The Act also requires a prospectus
to be distributed to those interested in purchasing registered securities during the
distribution period. § 5(b)(2) of the '33 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77e(b)(2) (1970); SEC v.
Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1098 (2d Cir. 1972) (prospectus must
contain all information in registration statement and most current information concerning sales of security).
1 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1970).
12 Initial registration under the '34 Act is required for corporations with assets of
one million dollars and a class of equity securities held by 500 or more shareholders, §
12(g)(1) of the '34 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 781(g)(1) (1970), under the requirements of § 13 of
the '34 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78(m) (1970).
11The antifraud provisions of the '33 Act are § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1970); § 12,
15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1970); and § 17a, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1970). Although the entire
'34 Act is basically concerned with the prevention of fraud, the principle antifraud
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civil and criminal penalties for disseminating false or misleading
statements in connection with the purchase or sale of securities
against issuing companies, company officials and individuals involved in the retail sales of securities. The Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) may compel compliance with the provisions of
the securities laws 4 and, in addition, the courts have implied a statutory right for an individual injured by a violation to bring a private
cause of action under certain provisions of the acts.' 5
provisions of the '34 Act are § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970), and the associated Rule
lOb-5 of the Securities and Exchange Commission, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1976), and
§ 15(c)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78 0 (1970).
" The SEC may seek various judicial remedies to enforce the securities laws. See,
e.g., § 20 of the '33 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77t (1970) (injunction). The office of the Attorney
General, however, has the exclusive power to institutue criminal proceedings to enforce
the securities acts. See generally Symposium: Enforcement of the FederalSecurities
Laws, 24 EMORY L.J. 557 (1975).
11A private civil action for fraud in -connection with the issuance of securities
has been implied under §§ 11 & 12 of the '33 Act. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k and 1.
Additional liability may be imposed on controlling individuals in the issuing
corporation under § 15, 15 U.S.C. § 77o if liability is found under either § § 11 or 12.
There is some dispute as to an implied right of action under § 17(a) of the '33 Act, 15
U.S.C. § 77q(a). Daniel v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 410 F. Supp. 541, 546
(N.D. 11. 1976) (implied private right of action); Wulc v. Gulf & Western Indus. Inc.,
400 F. Supp. 99, 103 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (implied private right of action), contra, Architectural League v. Bartos, 404 F. Supp. 304, 313 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Welch Foods Inc. v.
Goldman, Sachs & Co., 398 F. Supp. 1393, 1401 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
Under the '34 Act sections 9(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78i(3) (1970); 14(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a)
(1970); 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1970); and 18(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a) make a private
civil action available. Likewise, an implied privaie right of action exists under the '34
Act through § 10b and Rule 10b-5. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 86768 (2d Cir. 1968) (Friendly, J., concurring), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). An
implied private action has been held to exist under § 12(g), 15 U.S.C. § 781(g) (1970),
1974).
of '34 Act. Kerber v. Kakos, 383 F. Supp. 625 (N.D. Ill.
The primary advantage to bringing an action under the securities laws, rather
than under common law theories of fraud, was the greater ease with which a violation
was established. However, the recent Supreme Court decision in Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfeler, 425 U.S. 185 (1976), held that scienter is a necessary element for private
causes of action under § 10(b) or Rule 10b-5. See RuLE 10b-5 Section, infra, for a
discussion of the impact of Ernst & Ernst. This requirement has made significant
inroads into plaintiffs' ability to prevail in a securities action. See, e.g., Mallinckrodt
Chem. Works v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 420 F. Supp. 231, 243 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (failure
to show scienter defeats fraud action concerning commercial paper); Alton Box Bd. Co.
v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 418 F. Supp. 1149, 1157 (E.D. Mo. 1976) (failure to show
scienter defeats actions concerning alleged concealment of information by brokerdealer on rating of commercial paper). Some cases hold that- a securities action no
longer retains the advantage of not requiring the proof of reliance necessary to support
a common law action. See, e.g., Chelsea Assocs. v. Rapanos, 527 F.2d 1266, 1271-72
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To develop the broad remedial purposes of the securities laws,
courts generally have looked to the substance, rather than the form
of a transaction in determining whether a scheme is within the regulatory scope of the acts.' 6 The Supreme Court formulated this approach in SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 7 in determining
whether the sale of oil leases in property situated near the site of a
proposed test oil well involved an investment contract. In Joiner
Leasing the Court avoided an express definition of a security, holding
only that the sale of the leases "had all the evils inherent in the
securities transactions which it was the aim of the Securities Act to
8
end."'
A few years later the Court affirmed and refined this approach in
SEC v. W.J. Howey Co. 9 The case involved the sale of citrus groves
to purchasers who were also offered service contracts for cultivation,
harvest, and marketing of the crops. In holding that the sale involved
a security, the Court stated that "the test is whether the scheme
involves an investment of money in a common enterprise with profits
to come solely from the efforts of others.""0 These four criteria are
often cited as providing the basic framework for determining the
existence of a "security." 2' The Supreme Court recently stated that
the Howey test was the "touchstone" of the essential attributes of a
security.22
(6th Cir. 1975); Titan Group, Inc. v. Faggen, 513 F.2d 234, 238-39 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 840 (1975).
Other procedural advantages, hpwever, for bringing a suit under the securities acts
still exist. Nationwide venue and service of process is available to the plaintiff under
Rule 10b-5, 15 U.S.C. § 77v (1970); 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1970). See Comment, Notes As
Securities Under The SecuritiesActs of 1933And The SecuritiesExchange Act of 1934,
36 MD. L. REv. 233 (1976).
,1See, e.g., United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 851-52
(1975); SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 466 (1969); C.N.S. Enterprises, Inc.
v. G&G Enterprises, Inc., 508 F.2d 1354, 1357 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 825
(1975).
1 320 U.S. 344 (1943).
"1 Id. at 349.
" 328 U.S. 293 (1948).
,' Id. at 301.
2 In Howey, however, the Supreme Court was defining what constitutes an investment contract under the securities laws, and at least one opinion has recently suggested that the test is of little value in the context of determining whether a note is a
security. See text accompanying note 20 supra. See text accompanying note 20 supra.
Exchange Nat'l Bank v. Touche Ross & Co., 544 F.2d 1126, 1136 (2d Cir. 1976).
22 United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 852 (1975) (rejecting
allegation that shares of stock in a public housing cooperative were investment contracts).
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In United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman,3 the Supreme
Court emphasized that substance must prevail over form both for
excluding and including transactions within the statutory definition
of a security.Y In Forman the Court rejected the Second Circuit's
expansive analysis of the profit element of the Howey test as applicable to stock evidencing ownership in units of a cooperative housing
development.26 The Forman opinion indicated that the Court views
the Howey test as an integrated whole, and that no single element is
necessarily sufficient to bring a transaction within the ambit of the
federal securities laws. While the Court reaffirmed the validity of the
Howey criteria, it clearly did not intend the formulation to serve as
a vehicle to stretch the federal securities laws to every area where
federal regulation might conceivably be desirable.Y
In employing the definition of "investment contract" set forth in
Howey, several lower courts have decided cases by focusing on only
one or more elements of the formulation.Y This approach has allowed
a variety of transactions to be bootstrapped into the scope of the
securities laws under the auspices of the Howey test. One of the
dangers inherent in this "one element" method is the inevitably
anomalous results among various courts. These inconsistent results
have had the practical effect of confusing rather than clarifying the
definition of a security.
23

Id.

Id.
Although the stockholders were unable to realize any capital gains on their
stock, the Second Circuit found at least three ways in which the tenants expected to
"profit" from their "investment." The first method of profit was from the tax deductability of the portion of the rental charge used to pay the interest on the mortgage. The
second source of profits was the savings over the cost of comparable housing reflected
in the low rental charged by the subsidized cooperative. The third proposed source of
profit proposed by the Second Circuit was the possibility of net income derived from
the leasing by the cooperative of commercial facilities located in the building. However, the Supreme Court held that these potential sources of "profit" were not the type
of economic interest that characterized a security. Id. at 855-58.
2' The circumstances surrounding the development of the cooperative would seem
to negate any profit expectations. The cooperative's development was sponsored by a
nonprofit membership corporation in order to provide low income housing. The cooperative received substantial financial subsidies for from the State of New York. In order
to live in an apartment in Co-op City a tenant was required to purchase shares of stock
related to the size of his apartment. On relocation, the tenant was required to resell
his stock to the corporation at its original cost. Id.
24
22

r' 421 U.S. at 859 n.26.
21 See, e.g., Fargo Partners v. Dain Corp., 540 F.2d 912 (8th Cir. 1976) (not a
security where profits not dependent solely from the efforts of others); Hector v. Wiens,
533 F.2d 429 (9th Cir. 1976) ("solely from efforts of others" not construed literally).
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This situation is illustrated by the conflict among the lower courts
over whether discretionary commodities accounts29 are investment
contracts and, as a result, securities. One line of cases has held that
discretionary commodities accounts can never be securities, ° rationalizing that since there is no sharing of profits and losses by the
broker's customers, the commonality element of the Howey test is not
met.3 1 The most recent case to follow this rationale is Curranv. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. 321 In Curran the court reasoned that although the defendant-broker entered into similar contracts with several investors, one investor's success or failure would
have no direct impact on the other investors. 33 Thus, although the
customers were represented by a common agent, they were not joint
participants in a common enterprise in a horizontal sense.34 The
Curran court dismissed the case since it found no securities in35
volved.
In contrast, a second line of authority concerning commodities
accounts 36 construes the "common enterprise element" of the
Howey test to be satisfied when a single investor commits his funds
to a broker hoping to make a profit.37 This construction is character21Discretionary commodities accounts are usually maintained by inexperienced
investors, who give their brokers complete discretion to determine what commodities
contracts should be bought or sold for their accounts, Hodes & Dreyfus, Discretionary
Trading Accounts in Commodity Futures-Are They Securities?, 30 Bus. LAw. 99
(1974) [hereinafter cited as Hodes & Dreyfus].
11See, e.g., Milnarik v. M-S Commodities, Inc., 457 F.2d 274 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 887 (1972); Stevens v. Woodstock, Inc., 372 F. Supp. 654 (N.D. Ill.
1974); Arnold v. Bache & Co., Inc., 377 F. Supp. 61 (M.D. Pa. 1973); Stucker v.
DuPont Glore Forgan, Inc., 59 F.R.D. 129 (N.D. Cal. 1973); Wasnowic v. Chicago Bd.
of Trade, 352 F. Supp. 1066 (M.D. Pa.), aff'd, 491 F.2d 752 (3d Cir. 1972).
11See generally Hodes & Dreyfus, supra note 29.
32 [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
95,862 (E.D. Mich.
Dec. 27, 1976).
3 Id. at 91,131.
11Id. The Currancourt followed the reasoning of Milnarik v. M-S Commo dities,
457 F.2d 274 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 887 (1972). Cases following Milnarikhave
found the element of commonality lacking where there is no common enterprise in a
horizontal sense among several investors. Horizontal commonality is present when the
fate of any one investor's capital is directly connected to the success or failure of the
other investors' commitments.
[1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,862 at 91,131.
' See, e.g., Rochkind v. Reynolds Sec., Inc., 388 F. Supp. 254 (D. Md. 1975);
Marshall v. Lamson Bros., 368 F. Supp. 486 (S.D. Iowa 1974); Espey v. Shearson,
Hamill & Co., 341 F. Supp. 764 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Anderson v. Francis I. duPont & Co.,
291 F. Supp. 705 (D. Minn. 1968).
37 See, e.g., Marshall v. Lamson Bros., 368 F. Supp. 486, 489 (S.D. Iowa 1974)
(common enterprise requirement refers to relationship between broker and investor;
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ized as "vertical commonality" since it requires the fortunes of the
investor to be inextricably bound up with the efforts of the promo5
recently
tors..3 1 The court in E.F. Hutton & Co. v. Burkholder"
referred to this second line of reasoning, implicitly finding that where
a customer relies exclusively on the efforts of his broker, the resulting
discretionary commodities account is a security." Thus, the court
found that where a customer controlled his own account as in
Burkholder, the account was not a security since the crucial element
of reliance on dealer efforts was missing."
Use of these different approaches by the courts lends little guidance prior to adjudication as to whether commodities accounts will
be held to be securities. Multiple interpretations are not unique to
the commonality element of the Howey test; a similar variety of
results have been produced under the other criteria." This vacillation
by the lower courts has created uncertainty as to what is a security,
and has fostered a great de al of judicial creativity in expanding the
scope of the securities law to include a wide range of financial dealings. This lack of a clear and consistent definition has left investors
to test the applicability ofthe securities laws to their financial plans
on an ad hoc basis.
In Daniel v. InternationalBrotherhood of Teamsters43 a district
court recently interpreted the definition of a security to. include an
interest in a noncontributory, compulsory" pension plan. 5 The plainunlikely that protection of securities acts "is available only to those hapless capitalists
who are not alone in their misfortune").
1 The effect of vertical commonality is merger of the dependence and commonality elements of the Howey test for defining a security, see text accompanying note 20
supra. But see Bromberg, Commondities Law and Securities Law-Overlaps and
Preemptions, 1 J. CORP. L. 217, 253-56 (1976).
31 413 F. Supp. 852 (D.D.C. 1976). Plaintiff, a securities and commodities broker,
sought a judgment for money allegedly owed on a commodity futures account. The
defendant-investor denied authorization of several transactions in his account and
counter-claimed for wrongful liquidation of his account.
40 Id.

' Id. at 860.

See, e.g., Fargo Partners v. Dain Corp., 540 F.2d 912 (8th Cir. 1976) (investor
in apartment building not dependent on the efforts of others for profit); United States
v. Gibbs, [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 195,839 (10th Cir.
April 2, 1976) (investors contributing capital for construction of motel relied on efforts
of others to realize profits); SEC v. Galaxy Foods, Inc., 417 F. Supp. 1225 (E.D.N.Y.
1976) (investor franchisees in grocery franchise scheme dependent on the efforts of
franchisor).
11410 F. Supp. 541 (N.D. I1. 1976), aff'd, FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,141 (7th
Cir. Aug. 20, 1977) (extensive analysis reflects reasoning of district court).
In a "noncontributory" pension plan the employer bears the total financial
12
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tiff, a member of the union that sponsored the pension plan, alleged
fraud under the securities acts46 in connection with the administration and maintenance of the pension fund.47
The Daniel court determined that the securities acts were prima
facie applicable to employee pension plans, finding nothing in an
examination of the legislative history and content of the acts to suggest a contrary conclusion." The court partially documented its conclusion by citing a thirty-six year old opinion of the SEC Commissioner" interpreting the registration requirements of the '33 Act as
applicable to certain types of employee pension plans."' The compulsory type of pension plans involved in Daniel, however, were not
among those considered to be securities. 51The SEC counsel had concluded that the compulsory nature of involuntary pension plans precluded them from constituting an "investment" under the Howey
definition. In order to constitute an investment, value must be exchanged for an interest in the plan. An involuntary plan was considburden, unlike a contributory plan where the financing is by the employer and employee jointly. Note, Interests in a Noncontributory, Compulsory Employee Pension
Plan Deemed Subject to the Antifraud Provisions of the Federal Securities Laws,
Daniel v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 22 VILL. L. REv. 195, 196 n.14
(1977). In a "compulsory" plan the employer routinely deducts the contribution from
the employee's salary without his consent.
410 F. Supp. at 552-53.
The plaintiff in Daniel alleged fraud under § 17(a) of the '33 Act, 15 U.S.C. §
77q(a) (1970); § 10(b) of the '34 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1970); and SEC Rule 10b-5, 17
C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1976).
" The petitioner in the case was a retired union member, who claimed he was
entitled to pension benefits promised by the union after 20 years. The union ruled him
ineligible since he had not worked twenty continuous years due to an involuntary twomonth lay-off. The union member brought an antifraud action under the securities
laws against the union, alleging fraudulent misrepresentations in connection with the
sale of plaintiff's interest in the union pension fund and fraudulent practices in connection with the administration of the fund. 410 F. Supp. at 543.
Id. at 547 citing H.R. REP. No. 1838, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 41 (1934).
410 F. Supp. at 547-48 (1941 opinion of SEC Commissioner Purcell). The SEC
position on pension plans is contained in the opinion of John F. Davis, Assistant
General Counsel of the SEC, [1941-1944 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
95,195 (1941); 1 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCI)
2105.53 at 2579 (1941).
1 Id. The SEC has considered voluntary, contributory pension plans as "an attempt to dispose of a security for value" under § 2(3) of the '33 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(3)
(1970), for thirty-five years.
1 The SEC has not considered pension plans to involve the sale of a security as
long as the employee is compelled to contribute to the plan or does not make a voluntary election to contribute to the plan. Where there is no element of volition on the
part of the employee, the plans are viewed as a gift and do not involve the sale of
anything. 1 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 2105.53 at 2579 (1941).
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ered a gift from the employer which the employee received for nothing.2 Since no exchange of value was involved, the pension plan
could not be the "sale" of a security to which the federal acts applied.
The Daniel court reasoned that the SEC's counsel was unrealistic
in viewing an employer's contribution to the pension fund as a gift
rather than compensation in return for employees' services. The court
could find no distinction, in terms of an investment, between employer contribution plans and situations where the employee receives'
the contribution in cash as part of his wages and then voluntarily
elects to pay the cash into the fund. Consequently, the employee's
interest in the pension fund was held to be a voluntary election to
exchange labor for value and, thus, no less a "sale" than a voluntary
pension plan. 53 The resulting analysis posits that an employee exchanges his labor for an interest, along with fellow employees, in a
common fund, managed exclusively by a trustee, from which he expects payment at a later date in the form of pension payments. 4
The defendant in Daniel also argued that special legislation concerning pension funds enacted by Congress in the last twenty years
was intended to preempt application of the securities acts to pension
funds. 5 The court, however, held that the legislative history surrounding the various pension legislation indicated that these acts
were designed to complement the securities laws rather than displace
them. 6 Further, even if the recent pension legislation were intended
52Id. See also Hipple & Harkelroad, Anomalies of SEC Enforcement: Two Areas
of Concern, 24 EMORY L.J. 697, 705 (1975) (supporting the SEC position).
" 410 F. Supp. at 547-48. The Daniel opinion found that the SEC policy of protecting only those employees who participated in a voluntary plan was illogical. The
court held that this policy in effect singled out purchasers of pension fund security
interests for special inquiry by looking to their subjective state of mind to determine
the "voluntariness" of the purchase, and thus, the existence of an "investment decision." Id.
", Id. The Daniel court suggested that the employees exercised some degree of
discretion concerning participation in the plan through their union votes. Id. at 553.
See also amicus brief of SEC filed in Daniel appeal [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1195,846 (Jan. 1977) (supporting position of permitting recovery
under the antifraud provisions where employee's decision to accept or retain job was
materially influenced by fraudulent representations about pension).
0 410 F. Supp. at 548-49. Other pension legislation discussed included the Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § § 80a(11) - 80a(52) (1970); the 1958 Welfare
and Pension Plans Disclosure Act, 29 U.S.C. § § 301-309 (1970); the Investment Companies Amendment Act of 1970, 15 U.S.C. § 80a(2) (1970); and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (1970).
-' 410 F. Supp. at 549.
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to supplant the registration provisions of the securities laws,57 there
were no indications that remedies provided by the pension legislation
excluded the application of the antifraud provisions of the securities
laws."'

The Daniel case is the first federal case to construe the securities
acts to apply to pension plans since the enactment of recent federal
legislation concerning pension plans. 9 The extension of the securities
acts in this area was accomplished through a broad application of the
Howey investment of money criteria, supported by the court's construction of the remedial purposes of the acts."° Thus, the Daniel case
is representative of the expansive approach generally taken by lower
courts to extend the remedies afforded by the securities laws to areas
not previously considered covered by the acts.'
One recent approach used as an aid to characterizing a transaction as an "investment contract" concentrates on the expectations
of an investor from his participation in a financial scheme. Although
life insurance contracts traditionally have not been considered securities,62 in Graingerv. State Securities Life Insurance Co.,"3 the Fifth
Circuit found that certain features of a particular type of insurance
contract indicated it was a security. The court focused on two areas:
the promotional efforts of the insurance companies in selling the
contracts and whether the purchasers of the insurance bought the
contracts as an investment. 4 Investigation into what a participant
believed he had purchased revealed that the insured expected a large
11Arguably, however, the ERISA, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1381
(1970), a comprehensive regulation of employee benefit plans, provides disclosure requirements similar to the 1933 Securities Act. Compare ERISA § § 101, 104, 110, 29
U.S.C. § § 1021, 1024, 1030 (Supp. V 1975) with Securities Act of 1933 § 7, 15 U.S.C.
§ 77g (1970).
1 But see Hum v. Retirement Fund Trust, 424 F. Supp. 80 (C.D. Cal. 1976). The
Hum court allowed a motion to dismiss to prevail for failure to state a cause of action
in a fraud action under the securities laws brought by a participant in an employee
pension benefit plan against the defendant trust. The court summarily held that the
plaintiff's acquisition of the pension interest did not constitute the sale of a security,
and that ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1002 (1970), was plaintiff's exclusive remedy.
S9 See note 55 supra.
" See text acompanying note 54 supra.
See note 28 supra.
12See, e.g., Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 342-43 (1967) (dictum); 1 A.
BROMBERG, SEcuRrrIEs LAw: FRAUD, SEC RULE 10b-5, § 6.5(1) n.92 (rev. ed. 1975).
547 F.2d 303 (5th Cir. 1977).
e' Id. at 306-07. The Fifth Circuit rejected the district court's limited approach to
consideration of advertising and promotional efforts in defining a security. The lower
court had applied a form of the parol evidence rule, looking to advertising efforts only
where the instrument was not clear on its face.
'l
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monetary return in the form of dividends on his policy."5 This "state
of mind" inquiry parallels the "expectation of profits" element of the
Howey formulation."
A similar state of mind test was applied in Grenader v. Spitz.6 7
In Grenader, the Second Circuit looked to the expectations of the
shareholders to determine whether the stock in a privately sponsored
housing cooperative 8 constituted a "security." Relying on the recent
Supreme Court decision in United Housing Foundation, Inc. v.
9
where the Court concluded that cooperative shareholders
Forman,"
did not acquire the shares for profit but rather for residential living
purposes, the Second Circuit held that the shares were not securities."0 Since the purchase of the stock was tied to the lease of the
apartment,7 the tenants' primary motive in purchasing the stock was
to be able to live in the building." This use of the state of mind
criteria is aimed at determining the characteristics that indicate the
existence of an investment contract. The Grenaderopinion used the
expectations of the purchasers to determine whether they were "led
to expect profits solely from the efforts of others," 3 a combination of
'sId.

See text accompanying note 20 supra.
537 F.2d 612 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 541 (1976). Plaintiffs were tenants
an apartment building converted into a cooperative housof seventeen apartments ift
ing corporation. The owner promoted the plan to convert the building into a cooperative which would issue its shares to tenants, and use the proceeds to purchase the
building. Plaintiffs alleged violations of § § 5 & 17 of the Securities Act of 1933, 15
U.S.C. § § 77e & 77q, and § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §
78j(b).
537 F.2d at 618-19. See generally Note, Community Apartments: Condominium
or Stock Cooperative?, 50 CAUF. L. REv. 299 (1962); Note, Co-operativeApartment
Housing, 61 HARv. L. REv. 1407 (1948).
"
'

6

421 U.S. 837 (1975).

7oThe court determined that, although there was an opportunity to make a profit
as the underlying real estate increased in value, such a profit is possible in any real
estate transaction. 537 F.2d at 617.
"1The court determined that the stock did not have the characteristics of normal
securities since the shares were tied to residehcy in the apartments. The cooperative
shares were nontransferable, a terminating tenant was required to relinquish his stock
in the cooperative, and there were no possible cash dividends. Id.
72 Cf. R. Rosenberg & Sons v. St. James Sugar Coop., [1976-1977 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 95,826 (E.D. La. April 20, 1976) (motive of farmer
in purchasing shares in cooperative marketing association was assurance of a place to
process and market his crops, thus, insufficient dependence on efforts of others to
constitute security); Van Huss v. Associated Milk Producers, Inc., 415 F. Supp. 356
(N.D. Tex. 1976) (shares in milk cooperative not securities since farmer did not rely
on efforts of others for production of profits).
, See text accompanying note 20 supra.
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two Howey criteria. Incorporation of these two criteria into this state
of mind test in Grenader" and Grainger" creates yet another approach by lower federal courts to determining the existance of an
investment security.
Many recent cases have considered the distinction between note
instruments that are, and those that are not, securities under the
securities laws. Although the Howey formulation is widely used in
connection with investment contracts, its use in the note context is
less helpful." Several approaches to the problem have been offered
to fill any void left by an inability to use the Howey elements effectively.
The securities acts are textually more expansive in their treatment of notes as securities than of investment contracts. Both the '33
Act and the '34 Act contain an exception from "notes" considered to
be securities." These exceptions are usually construed to apply to
short-term commercial paper,78 since this type of commercial paper
is not ordinarily held for an investment." However, the general rule
that any note executed in connection with a commercial transaction
is not a security"0 is qualified by cases holding that if it is executed
74 537

F.2d 612 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 541 (1976).

547 F.2d 303 (5th Cir. 1977).
" Application of the Howey elements, see note 20 supra, to a promissory note
transaction indicates that a "common enterprise" is rarely involved. Most transactions
involve only a borrower and a lender. The profit element is always present in a note
case because the interest paid on the loan is profit. Furthermore, almost all loan
arrangements evidenced by a promissory note are "dependent on the efforts of others"
for repayment. Exchange Nat'l Bank v. Touche Ross & Co., 544 F.2d 1126, 1136-37
(1976) (rejecting use of Howey criteria in connection with note transaction) noted at
30 VAND. L. Rsv. 110 (1977). See text accompanying notes 82-98 infra.
71See note 3 supra for the '33 Act exemption in § 3(a)(3). Section 3(a) (10), 15
U.S.C. § 78a(10) (1970), of the '34 Act provides:
The term 'security' means any note, . . . but shall not include currency or any note, draft, bill of exchange, or banker's acceptance
which has a maturity at the time of issuance of not exceeding nine
months, exclusive of days of grace, or any renewal thereof the maturity
of which is likewise limited.
15 U.S.C. § 78a(10) (1970).
7 The antifraud provisions of the '33 Act, § § 12 and 17, expressly apply to
securities excluded from the other provisions of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § § 771 & q (1970).
No antifraud provisions in the '34 Act, however, refer to § 3(a)(10), 15 U.S.C. §
78c(a)(10) (1970). Presumably, the exclusions contained in § 3(a)(10) pertain to all
provisions of the '34 Act.
11See, e.g., Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 463 F.2d 1075, 1079-80 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 1009 (1972).
10See, e.g., McClure v. First Nat'l Bank, 497 F.2d 490 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 420
"
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as part of a scheme which has an investment nature, the note will be
considered a security.81 This commercial-investment distinction is
based on a court's conclusion that a transaction does not possess
subjectively determined characteristics sufficient to associate it with
an investment contract.
The subjective nature of the commercial-investment approach is
illustrated by the decision in Emisco Industries, Inc. v. Pro's Inc. 8
which concerns the issuance of promissory notes to finance the purchase of a business. In Emisco, the court applied an "impetus" test
as an aid in distinguishing between investment and commercial
notes, subjectively concluding that since the impetus for the transaction was the borrower's need for cash, the resulting promissory note
was not a security." However, in NBI Mortgage Investment Corp. v.
U.S. 930 (1974); Zeller v. Bogue Elec. Mfg. Corp., 476 F.2d 795 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 908 (1973); Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 463 F.2d 1075 (7th Cir. 1972).
11Any note issued in a commercial context, short or long term, involves the expenditure of money with the expectation of interest or income from the efforts of others
with little effort on the lender's part. Thus, any commercial note might conceivably
come within the investment contract of Howey. Failure to consider the 9 month maturity exception contained in § 3(a) of the '34 Act as controlling short term notes in
addition to the Howey criteria virtually writes this exception out of the securities acts.
See McClure v. First Nat'l Bank, 497 F.2d 490, 494-95 (5th Cir. 1974) (investment or
commercial nature of note entirely controls applicability of Act); Zeller v. Bogue Elec.
Mfg. Corp., 476 F.2d 795 (2d Cir. 1973) (demand notes with investment nature are
securities). At least one court has suggested that the essential elements of an investment note distinguishing it from a commercial note should be some sort of profit
participation or other benefit beyond the repayment of loan interest. Throp Comm'l
Corp. v. Northgate Indus., Inc., [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
94,929 (D. Minn. Dec. 21, 1974).
' 543 F.2d 38 (7th Cir. 1976).
,3 Id. Emisco involved the purchase of a division of one company by another
company, which gave a promissory note as partial consideration for the purchase of
the assets. The plaintiff-buyer subsequently brought action against the vendor, under
§ 27 of the '34 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1970), for fraudulent misrepresentations in
violaton of § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1970) and Rule lob-5. The Seventh Circuit buttressed its opinion with its earlier decision in C.N.S. Enterprises, Inc. v. G&G Enterprises, Inc., 508 F.2d 1354 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 825 (1975), where it originated the "impetus" test. Id. at 1362-63. The "impetus" test focuses on which party
initiated the transaction. An example of its application would be where a consumer
seeks a loan for home improvements from a bank. The borrower who initiated the
transaction did so for his own purposes and more than likely was not solicited by the
bank to interest him in an investment. Under the impetus test the resulting promissory
note would not be considered a security. See, e.g., Tri-County State Bank v. Hertz,
418 F. Supp. 332, 341-42 (M.D. Pa. 1976) (uses impetus test concerning promissory
notes).
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Chemical Bank,84 in denying a motion for summary judgment, the
court found that a participationm in a construction loan, might be the
sale of a security" under the commercial-investment test. The bank
had originally agreed to finance completely the construction project,
but later sold a participation in the loan to an individual. Arguably,
had the Emisco "impetus" test been used, the sale would not have
been characterized as a security, since the bank offered the participation because it was no longer willing to commit its cash to the venture. 71 These varying results in similar transactions exemplify the
lack of uniform criteria for applying the commercial-investment test.
The major weakness of the commercial-investment test is that it
is seldom consistently applied. Courts using the test have failed to
isolate any generally recognizable characteristics that state the extent and nature of the classes of "investment" or "commercial"
notes. The securities acts themselves offer little textual clarification
of the distinction between commercial and investment transactions.8
Thus, the subjective nature of the commercial-investment test does
not provide a predictable standard to assess the status of promissory
notes prior to litigation.
An alternative approach to the commercial-investment test was
recently applied in Great Western Bank & Trust v. Kotz, 9 where the
plaintiff-bank, on failure to receive repayment on an unsecured note,
brought an action alleging fraud against an executive of the issuing
company." Determining that the transaction did not involve a security, the Ninth Circuit applied a "risk capital" test.' The risk capital
" [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 95,632 (S.D.N.Y. June
25, 1976).
A "participation" is expressly included in § 2(1) of the '33 Act definition of
security. 15 U.S.C. § 77(b) (1970).
" In NBI Mortgage the defendant bank entered into a building construction loan
with a realty company evidenced by a promissory note. In holding that the participation could be a security, the court, on a motion for summary judgment, rejected the
argument that there was no difference between a bank initially issuing a construction
loan, plainly a commercial transaction, and the subsequent sale of a participation in
that loan. The court drew the distinction that the owner of the participation was dependent on the managerial efforts of the managing bank. [1976-1977 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,632 at 90,147.
" Id. As a result of delays in construction and resulting extensions of repayment
deadlines, the bank sold a participation to an individual. The bank apparently solicited the sale.
'33 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77b (1970); '34 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78c (1970).
Kg 532 F.2d 1252 (9th Cir. 1976). The bank in Great Western alleged fraud under
§ 10(b), Rule 10b-5 and § 17(a) of the '33 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1970).
532 F.2d at 1253.
" This 'risk' analysis was first considered in Silver Hills Country Club v. Sobieski,
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test uses the characteristics usually applied in the commercialinvestment 2 context to measure the risk of non-payment associated
with a loan evidenced by a promissory note. The Great Western court
reasoned that as the risk of non-payment increased, dependence on
the efforts of others for repayment or profit increased proportionally,
indicating a transaction of an investment nature. 3 The court of appeals held that this test distinguished between the "risky loan," a
commercial transaction, and "risk capital,"94 money invested in a
security.
The risk capital test suffers from a weakness similar to the
commercial-investment analysis in its dependence on ill-defined
characteristics for its application. The lower courts have offered little
guidance as to what level of risk will transform an ordinary note
transaction into a security. 5 Thus, the risk capital test foreseeably
could permit arbitrary application by the courts resulting in lack of
predictability associated with its use.
55 Cal. 2d 811, 361 P.2d 906, 13 Cal. Rptr. 186 (1961). There, the court found that
memberships sold in a country club were securities. See, e.g., Pollock, Notes Issued in
Syndicated Loans-A New Test to Define Securities, 32 Bus. LAw. 537, 544-45 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as Pollock]; Coffey, The Economic Realities of a "Security:" Is
There A More MeaningfulFormula?, 18 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 367 (1967). The Supreme
Court recently declined to apply the risk-capital test in United Housing, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 857 n.24 (1975). However, the Court explained why the test was
not applicable to the facts in the Forman case, indicating that it did not reject the test
for all purposes. Thus, the Supreme Court has not yet definitively ruled on the general
applicability of the risk-capital test for defining a security.
92 See text accompanying notes 80-87 supra.
'3 In SEC v. W.J. Howey, 328 U.S. 293 (1946), one element of the test to determine
whether a transaction involved a security was if the scheme depended on profits "to
come solely from the efforts of others." Id. at 301. Arguably, the Great Western court
borrows from the "efforts of others" element of the Howey test. Pollock, supra note
91, at 544.
A form of the risk-capital approach was recently used in determining whether an
investment contract was a security in Ballard & Cordell Corp. v. Zo~ler & Danneburg
Exploration, 544 F.2d 1059 (10th Cir. 1976), petitionfor cert. filed, 45 U.S.L.W. 3588
(U.S. March 1, 1977) (No. 76-1165). The court applied the Howey "reliance on the
efforts of others" criteria to determine that a sale of oil and gas leases did not involve
a security, at the same time observing that most investment contracts involved the
financing of "speculative schemes." Id. at 1065. Thus, this decision indicates some
degree of overlap between the nature of investment contracts and notes held to be
securities.
"1

532 F.2d at 1257.

,5Id. The risk-capital approach appears to yield results inconsistent with traditional opinion when applied to an unsecured note evidencing a personal loan. In personal loans the risk of nonpayment is high, yet the note is a type usually excluded from
the securities acts. Exchange Nat'l Bank v. Touche Ross & Co., 544 F.2d 1126, 113738 (2d Cir. 1976).
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Recognizing the basic failure of prior judicial attempts to make
the commercial-investment and risk capital test more objective, the
Second Circuit rejected these approaches for determining whether a
note was a security in Exchange National Bank v. Touche Ross &
Co.9" The suit was brought by a bank against the accounting firm of
a company that had defaulted on three unsecured promissory notes
held by the bank. The bank alleged that the accountants had issued
false and misleading opinions concerning the company's financial
position. 7
After discussing the problems inherent in prior approaches to defining note securities,98 the Exchange NationalBank court concluded
that the best alternative was a "greater recourse to the statutory
language" of the securities acts.9 The court noted that the "plain
terms" of the '34 Act provided that a security does not include "any
note. . . which has a maturity at the time of issuance of not exceeding nine months." The '33 Act states that a security includes "any
note" except for the section 3(a)(3) current transactions exception",9
to that act's registration requirements. The Second Circuit thus
determined that the plain terms of the acts' definitions should be
applied "unless the context otherwise required."'' 1 The burden of
showing that the context required otherwise is on a party asserting
that a note of more than nine months maturity is not within the '34
Act (or that a note maturing in less than nine months is within the
'34 Act) or that any note is excluded from the antifraud provisions
of the '33 Act."0 2 Thus, the burden of proving that the "context of
the transaction otherwise requires" would be on the party maintaining that the literal terms of the acts should not be applied.0 "
" 544 F.2d 1126 (2d Cir. 1976).
91 Id. at 1128. The bank alleged fraud under § 17 of the '33 Act, § 10(b) of the '34
Act and rule 10b-5.
" Id. at 1133-37.
98 Id. at 1137.
100Id. § 3(a) of the '34 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78a(10) (1970). See note 3 supra.
,01
The preface to the definition sections of both the '33 and '34 Acts contains the
language "unless the context otherwise requires." 15 U.S.C. § 77b (1970); 15 U.S.C. §
78c (1970).
102 544 F.2d at 1137. See note 13 supra for the antifraud provisions of the '33 Act.
103 The Second Circuit's approach in Exchange Bank is the latest in a series of
decisions by that court of appeals attempting to develop a successful test defining the
term "security." See, e.g., Zeller v. Bogue Elec. Mfg. Corp., 476 F.2d 795,800 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 908 (1973) (statutory construction approach); Movietab, Inc. v.
Berkey Photo, Inc., 321 F. Supp. 806 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), af'd, 452 F.2d 662 (2d Cir. 1971)
(literal approach).
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This burden apparently could be met by showing that the purposes
of the securities acts0 4 would not be promoted by including the particular transaction under the securities laws. The Exchange Bank
court found no justification for excluding the particular notes in the
case from the securities acts." 5
This "context" language of the securities acts has been cited in
prior opinions 5 as the basis for examining the particular note involved to see whether, in the context of the transaction, it should be
regarded as a "security."'' 7 These cases then apply the commercialinvestment test, omitting the emphasis placed by the Exchange Bank
opinion on the purpose of the securities laws in determining whether
a note is a security.
Since the Exchange Bank approach focuses inquiry on whether
the purposes of Congress would be served by treating the note as a
security, the outcome of any decision utilizing this approach is dependent on how broadly the court defined the purposes of the acts.
Therefore, a court defining the purposes of the securities laws very
broadly might include any note as a security, since it is conceivable
that fraud could be associated with any note transaction. In an. attempt to discourage this type of overbroad construction, the
Exchange Bank court cited several examples of notes not within the
securities laws. Notes evidencing ordinary consumer transactions
were the primary focus of the list, such as character loans and home
mortgage" 8 loans. The list also included some types of "short term"
notes. '° The Second Circuit concluded that if a note does not have a
The text of the Exchange Bank opin ion repeatedly expresses a concern for the
purposes of Congress in enacting the securities laws. This purpose is characterized as
protection of the "average investor against fraud in the public offering of common
investment instruments." 544 F.2d 1133. See text accompanying notes 7-10 supra.
205

544 F.2d at 1139.

1

See, e.g., C.N.S. Enterprises, Inc. v. G&G Enterprises, Inc., 508 F.2d 1354, 1357
(7th Cir. 1975); Zeller v. Bogue Elec. Mfg. Corp., 476 F.2d 795, 800 (2d Cir. 1973).
"07The "context" phrase in the language opening the definitions sections of the
acts could possibly refer to the context of the statutes, not the transaction. Notes As
Securities UnderThe Securities Act Of 1933 And The SecuritiesExchangeAct of 1934,
36 MD.L. REv. 233, 239 (1976).
"1 544 F.2d at 1337-38. The court lists several examples of transactions it would
hypothetically exclude from the securities acts: "the note delivered in consumer financing, the note secured by a mortgage on a home, the short-term note secured by a
lien on a small business or some of its assets, the note evidencing a 'character' loan to
a bank customer, short-term notes secured by an assignment of accounts receivable,
or a note which simply formalizes an open-account debt incurred in the ordinary course
of business (particularly if, as in the case of the customer of a broker, it is collateralized)." Id. at 1138.
-' The Second Circuit apparently meant to include only those notes not part of a
"'
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"strong family resemblance" to these hypothetical examples and
"has a maturity exceeding
nine months," section 10(b) of the '34 Act
10
should be held to apply.
The "purpose" test offers greater flexibility, thereby allowing it to
be used in diverse factual situations."' Likewise, the "purpose" test
seems preferable to other approaches because it does not attempt to
create artificial definitions that may depart from congressional intent. In order to apply the "purpose" test a court must look at the
type of activity Congress was trying to prevent by enacting the securities laws.
Theoretically, this approach should focus a court's attention on
the congressional purposes behind the securities laws, thus narrowing
the field of transactions intended to be included in the term
"security." In practical application, however, a court may tend to
apply the acts to situations not intended to be securities if the court
fails to frame a sufficiently narrow purpose for the securities laws."'
Another threat to the workability of the test is that courts may
simply use the enumerated examples 2 in the Exchange Bank opinion
as an exclusive list of notes not intended to be subject to the securities
acts. This rigid application of the Exchange Bank test would result
in bypassing an independent review of whether a particular note is
of the type Congress intended to affect. The issue in a misapplication
of this type would depend on the similarity to the listed examples of
the facts in a particular case. Thus, the "unless the context otherwise
requires" element of the "purpose test" would be subsumed under
the "strong family resemblance" language of the Exchange Bank
opinion.
A similar analysis appears to have been the basis for the court's
opinion in The Fund of Funds, Ltd. v. Vesco.1"1 Relying on the
large investment scheme as "short term notes," since it mentioned "short-term" only
in connection with "a small business." Id.
11 Id. The court also left "for another day the status under the 1934 Act of a note
with a maturity of nine months or less that does not bear a strong family resemblance,
and the question whether a note which because of its short term would not be a security
under § 10(b) of the 1934 Act might be one within the antifraud provisions of the 1933
Act." Id. at 1138 n.19.
M The risk-capital and the commercial-investment tests suffer from unpredictability when employed in varying factual situations. See text accompanying notes 8795 supra.
112The problem of potentially overbroad application of the securities laws associated with the Exchange Bank test was pointed out in Pollock, supra note 91, at 547.
" 544 F.2d at 1137-38. See note 108 supra for the examples of notes ordinarily
excluded from the securities acts cited in the Exchange Bank opinion.
M,[1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. RP. (CCH) 95,644 (S.D.N.Y. July
12, 1976).
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Exchange Bank test, the district court denied a motion to dismiss in
a securities fraud action in connection with promissory notes."I5 After
determining that the notes did not bear a "strong family resemblance" to those examples listed in Exchange Bank, the court concluded that there was no justification for excluding the notes from the
securities acts."16
Application of the "purpose" test in this manner offers no comparative advantage over the "risk-capital" or "commercialinvestment" tests, which suffer from a lack of objective criteria for
application. Where the "purpose" test has thus far been applied, it
has suffered from the same artificial definitions problem evident in
other approaches.
Although recent decisions evince an expansive interpretation of
the term "security" among lower federal courts, judicial analysis offers little in terms of consistent guidelines as to what financial transactions are excluded from the application of the securities laws.
Courts are often willing to discard substantially any restrictive language contained in the securities laws in order to afford protection to
an investor. In addition, the courts are willing to expand prior judicial
approaches to defining a security, allowing extensive application of
the securities acts.
This liberal expansion of the scope of the securities laws may be
tempered to some extent by the Supreme Court's recent decision in
Forman."7 In that decision, the Court emphasized that while the
substance of a transaction should be considered over its form, the
securities acts were not intended to be a comprehensive solution for
all areas where federal regulation might be needed."' Application of
the Howey criteria, for defining a security, reaffirmed in Forman,
may restrict the growing tendency of the courts to broaden the potential sweep of the securities laws."' An adoption of a more unified
"I Id. in Fund of Funds, a subsidiary brought a fraud action under the securities
laws against its parent corporation alleging that the parent corporation, through a
series of unauthorized actions, borrowed 60 million dollars from its subsidiary in exchange for three promissory notes. Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction, alleging that the three promissory notes were not
"securities" within the definition of the securities acts.
I Id. at 90,195. The Fund of Funds opinion concluded that the notes were securities for the purposes of the Investment Advisors Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (1970),
as well as the '33 and '34 Acts. Id. at 90,195.
1" 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
"' Id. at 859 n.26.
' Results in securities

cases before the Supreme Court in the last two years
indicate that the Court is unwilling to extend the scope of the securities laws. Santa
Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 97 S.Ct. 1292 (1977) (rule 10b-5 does not extend to cover

